A NOTE ON ARÉVALO-TOMÉ AND CHAMORRO-RIVAS: LOCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE IMPROVEMENT IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF COURNOT COMPETITION
作者： Chia-Hung Sun
DOI:
关键词: Outcome (game theory) 、 Social planner 、 Cournot competition 、 Variable (computer science) 、 Social Welfare 、 Microeconomics 、 Spatial model 、 Economics 、 Production (economics)
摘要: In a recent paper in this journal, Arevalo-Tome and Chamorro-Rivas claim to have shown that, two-stage game where Cournot duopoly firms discriminate over two marketplaces on line, social planner can use the firm�s location variable as an instrument for reallocating production from equilibrium spatial pattern to optimal outcome. This note points out that with linear demand there is no need such welfare improvement, because equilibrium locations are indeed socially optimal. The also discusses possibility of using general demand.
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