作者: Lijue Lu , Jesús Marín-Solano , Jorge Navas
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.05.031
关键词: Business 、 Pareto principle 、 Profit (economics) 、 Supply chain management 、 Microeconomics 、 Sequential game 、 Time preference 、 Goodwill 、 Vertical integration 、 Cost sharing
摘要: In this paper, we study an advertising dynamic game in supply chain management under the assumption that the agents differ in their time preference rates. We study two coordination mechanisms: the cost sharing program, where the retailer can get some reimbursement of the advertising cost from the manufacturer; and the vertical integration, where the two players aim to maximize the joint profit. We derive the time-consistent cooperative advertising strategies in each coordination setting, and we compare them with the non …