作者: Stan Klein
DOI: 10.1007/S11097-012-9285-8
关键词: Social connectedness 、 Social cognition 、 Epistemology 、 Personal narrative 、 Personal identity 、 Psychology 、 Consciousness 、 Psychology of self 、 Self 、 Philosophy of mind
摘要: In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of Lockean account diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in narrative. argue recent case studies show while critique may hold with regard some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant respect accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue address concerns question from vantage point there are (at least) two aspects self—the self psycho-physical instantiation (what term epistemological self) and person subjectivity ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). Each is held be necessary component selfhood, and, interaction, they appear jointly sufficient synchronic (Klein As pertains diachronicity, by contrast, contend self, itself, precariously situated do work required coherent theory across time, better positioned take up challenge.