A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games
作者： Theo S. H. Driessen , Dongshuang Hou
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-009-0216-Z
关键词: Mathematical economics 、 Nucleolus 、 Type (model theory) 、 Combinatorics 、 Characterization (mathematics) 、 Regular polygon 、 Intersection 、 Pairwise comparison 、 Mathematics 、 Core (game theory) 、 Bondareva–Shapley theorem
摘要: For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for intersection prekernel with core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within core are required to be in equilibrium. This system non-linear equations solved its unique solution agrees nucleolus.
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