Separability and Non-Individuality: Is It Possible to Conciliate (At Least A Form Of) Einstein’s Realism with Quantum Mechanics?

摘要: In this paper we argue that physical theories, including quantum mechanics, refer to some kind of ‘objects’, even if only implicitly. We raise questions about the logico-mathematical apparatuses commonly employed in such bringing light metaphysical presuppositions underlying apparatuses. point out incongruities discourse holding objects would be entities ‘new kind’ while still adhering framework use deal with classical objects. The apparatus hinder us from being complete agreement ontological novelties theories quanta seem advance. Thus, join those who try investigate a ‘logic mechanics’, but different view: looking for formal foundation supposed new ontology. As consequence move, can revisit Einstein’s ideas on reality and propose that, by considering object traditionally termed ‘non-individuals’, it is possible sustain they obey conditions ‘physical realities’, so will talk ‘principle separability’ sense which not disagreement mechanics. So, departure mechanics might softened at least concerning form his realism, sees separated as distinct realities’.