Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model

摘要: This paper analyzes the Silicon Valley model as a novel economic institution in domain of technological product system innovation. We analyze informational relationship well governance relationships between venture capitalists and cluster entrepreneurial firms. The conditions that make efficient are identified, leading to an understanding significance standardized interfaces, modularization, information encapsulation. then examine governance/incentive aspect by integrating models Aoki (Towards Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) Baldwin Clark (Design Rules—Vol. 1: Power Modularity, 2000). concludes evaluating applicability other localities industries. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 759–786. Department Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, RIETI, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan; Faculty Toyo 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, 112-8606, Japan. © 2002 Association for Economic Studies. Published Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. Journal Literature Classification Numbers: D21, L23, O32, P51, P52.