Competition in the market for political violence : Northern Irish Republicanism, 1969-1998

摘要: There has been considerable debate within the literature about how competition influences violent political organizations (VPOs). Applying economic theories of to production violence by terrorist or other VPOs yields insight into their strategic behavior. Subversive groups cannot survive and continue operate without a reservoir support, both active passive, constituent base they claim represent. These constituents exchange support for groups‘ when it is perceived advance preferred agenda. However, also generates opposition from those who perceive be misguided, counter-productive illegitimate. seek maintain increase power community choosing type amount that maximizes minimizes opposition. As such, are subject same forces supply, demand as firms in market. Indeed, qualitative time-series analysis Republican Northern Ireland finds typical market strategies employed, including attempts at product branding, productive outbidding, reductions monopolistic groups. Irish case demonstrates, monopoly an understudied but critical path decreasing levels achieving comprehensive conflict resolution.