Systems and methods for detecting domain generation algorithm (DGA) malware

作者: Cristina Vatamanu , Mihai-Razvan Benchea , Dragos-Teodor Gavrilut , Octavian Mihai Minea

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摘要: Domain generation algorithm (DGA) malware is detected by intercepting an external time request sent a potential DGA host, and replacing the received real with accelerated (future) designed to trigger time-dependent activity. The interception replacement are performed outside physical or virtual on different system such as distinct server router, hypervisor machine running same system, in order reduce risk that identifies substitution. Failed access requests triggered only at future times then used identify domain names generated malware, allowing proactive countermeasures.

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