The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts
作者： L. R. Gomez-Mejia , M. Nunez-Nickel , I. Gutierrez
DOI: 10.2307/3069338
关键词:
摘要: Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger …
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