摘要: Trading on private information creates inefficiencies because there is less than optimal risk sharing. This occurs the response of marketmakers to existence traders with reduce liquidity market. The institution monopolist specialist may ease this inefficiency somewhat by increasing While competing will expect a zero profit every trade, average his profits across trades. implies more liquid market when extensive trading information. Copyright 1989 University Chicago.
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