Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chain Planning

作者: Martin Albrecht

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02833-5_3

关键词:

摘要: In recent years, a large number of papers have been produced that propose and analyze mechanisms for supply chain coordination. The existing surveys about the literature this area is considerable, too.1 These surveys, however, are not exhaustive; surprisingly few emphasis has placed on central topic design coordination mechanisms, determination appropriate incentives decentralized parties in light information asymmetry.2

参考文章(123)
Chiaki Hara, Ilya Segal, Steve Tadelis, Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green Oxford University Press. ,(1997)
M. Guzelsoy, T. K. Ralphs, Duality for Mixed-Integer Linear Programs ,(2007)
David F Pyke, Rein Peterson, Edward Allen Silver, Inventory management and production planning and scheduling ,(1998)
Roger B. Myerson, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM Econometrica. ,vol. 47, pp. 61- 73 ,(1979) , 10.2307/1912346
John R. Birge, Franois Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming ,(2011)
Martin A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Contracting and Coordination with Stochastic Demand Springer, Boston, MA. pp. 233- 268 ,(1999) , 10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_8
Paul R. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work ,(2004)
Seungjin Whang, Coordination in operations: A taxonomy Journal of Operations Management. ,vol. 12, pp. 413- 422 ,(1995) , 10.1016/0272-6963(95)00010-P
ERHAN KUTANOGLU, S. DAVID WU, On combinatorial auction and Lagrangean relaxation for distributed resource scheduling Iie Transactions. ,vol. 31, pp. 813- 826 ,(1999) , 10.1023/A:1007666414678