Expropriation and direct investment

作者: Harold L. Cole , William B. English

DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(91)90019-3

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摘要: Abstract The paper considers a model in which private foreign investors make direct long-lived capital investments small developing country that is subject to stochastic shocks production. Depending upon the preferences of host country, we find expropriation can occur because either 'desperation or ‘opportunism’. We show under reasonable assumptions increased investment makes less likely occur, and level chosen by atomistic may be non-optimal.

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