Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays

作者: David M. Mandy

DOI: 10.1023/A:1008191911289

关键词:

摘要: … An upstream monopolist would be ``killing the (downstream) goose that laid the golden egg'' if it conducted sabotage against relatively efficient downstream rivals when its upstream …

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