Intra-Party Factions and Coalition Bargaining in Germany

摘要: Most formal theories of coalition formation are based on the assumption parties as unitary and forward-looking actors who bargain over portfolios future governmental policies in government process (e.g. Laver/Shepsle 1996, Thies 2001). In this paper we relax actor theorize about conditions under which intraparty factions play a role bargaining processes. Using simple model argue that outcomes processes (portfolio allocation, policy stated agreement) reflect positions strength party rather than actors. We evaluate argument case study Germany 1987/90 1998/2002. Party manifestos, platforms working groups, agreements used to derive all major (as actors), their key factions, policies. wordscore technique (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003), estimate with respect three most important dimensions, socio-economic, social, foreign affairs dimension. find support for allocation members is enforce contracts when ministerial discretion high.