Runtime Verification of Linux Kernel Security Module

作者: Ilya Shchepetkov , Denis Efremov

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摘要: The Linux kernel is one of the most important Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) projects. It installed on billions devices all over world, which process various sensitive, confidential or simply private data. crucial to establish and prove its security properties. This work-in-progress paper presents a method verify for conformance with an abstract policy model written in Event-B specification language. based system call tracing aims at checking that results execution do not lead accesses violate requirements. As basis it, we use additional interface formally proved satisfy requirements model. In order perform checks it reproduce intercepted calls accesses.

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