Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

摘要: This paper argues that adverse selection in the labour market, when viewed as part of a three-way interaction among workers, their current employers and universe alternative employers, may seriously impair worker's freedom to change jobs. When are better informed about abilities workers than potential they will presumably concentrate efforts prevent turnover on workers. If these lead fewer quits stream job changers should be composed disproportionately less able ones. inhibit two ways. First, firms unwilling hire from job-changing pool except at low wages. Second, who jobs marked by being an inferior group, which lowers future bargaining power Models phenomena can made account for many aspects observed market behaviour. Wage offers received based information available large. Yet, within any group receiving comparable wage (presumably whom publicly is equivalent), distinguish more capable Firms then keeping and, if even partially successful, job-changers Thus, whenever worker leaves his present firm enters "secondhand" he well identified someone whose ability is, some expected sense, below average. tendency has several important consequences. inhibited entering seek fill require especially "good" They rely instead internal pools which, itself, might limit extent inter-firm mobility. marking process accompanies impose substantial cost new As becomes employment history, it identifies him with changing pool. reduces turn, what employer must pay departure. The consequent loss income represent major barrier Third, wages secondhand reduced, since base quality actually Then, have declined, reduce work force. surplus return implicit reductions bid away entry-level markets. However, net effect generate patterns over course career (e.g. premiums, form either promises lifetime incomes or assumption general training costs, recovered through lower wages) place additional emphasis reducing