A Zero-Sum Game? Repression and Protest in China

作者: Yao Li

DOI: 10.1017/GOV.2017.24

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摘要: Most scholarship on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes focuses severe repression and transgressive protest (e.g. revolt), suggesting a zero-sum game played by the state challengers. However, burgeoning literature suggests that less brutal forms of states have emerged recent decades protesters these countries tend to limit their challenges, avoiding direct confrontation with authorities. If so, can notion truly capture nuances complexities regimes? Taking case China, this article offers systematic analysis pattern strong state. Drawing an original data set 1,418 events shows Chinese permits some (albeit limited) space for most confine themselves space. These findings thus provide quantitative evidence popular contention China is featured non-zero-sum game. Overall, study contributes more comprehensive complex understanding settings.

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