Testing Game Theory

作者: Jörgen W. Weibull

DOI: 10.1057/9780230523371_6

关键词:

摘要: An important development in economics is the emergence of experimental economics, and Werner Guth has been one its pioneers. Moving from armchair theorizing to controlled laboratory experiments may be as a step economic theory it once was for natural sciences move Aristotelian scholastic speculation modern empirical science.1

参考文章(30)
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics The American Economic Review. ,vol. 83, pp. 1281- 1302 ,(1993)
Werner Güth, Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum bargaining behavior : a survey and comparison of experimental results Journal of Economic Psychology. ,vol. 11, pp. 417- 449 ,(1990) , 10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z
John H. Kagel, Alvin E. Roth, The handbook of experimental economics Princeton University Press. ,(1995)
Jordi Brandts, Carles Solà, Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 36, pp. 138- 157 ,(2001) , 10.1006/GAME.2000.0818
Ken G Binmore, Avner Shaked, John Sutton, Testing non-cooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study The American Economic Review. ,vol. 75, pp. 1178- 1180 ,(1985)
Yves Sprumont, On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 93, pp. 205- 232 ,(2000) , 10.1006/JETH.2000.2657
Philip J. Reny, Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 59, pp. 257- 274 ,(1993) , 10.1006/JETH.1993.1017
Klaus Ritzberger, Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory Research Papers in Economics. ,(2002)
Jean -François Mertens, Shmuel Zamir, Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 14, pp. 1- 29 ,(1985) , 10.1007/BF01770224
Gary E. Bolton, Rami Zwick, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 10, pp. 95- 121 ,(1995) , 10.1006/GAME.1995.1026