On the impact of empirical attack models targeting marine transportation

摘要: It is known that 75% of international freight through maritime transportation. Indeed, as trade increases, ports face the pressure to improve their infrastructure in order maintain operations and respond market demands. Given such high level competition, ought leverage resources efficiently effectively, which has resulted increased automation capabilities adoption Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). For reasons, container terminal sector increasingly becoming susceptible various types debilitating threats. While a plethora research efforts, from both, control cyber perspectives have been dedicated tackling security CPS sectors, there still exists significant gap, rendered by lack properly comprehending accurately characterizing malicious attackers' capabilities, intents aims, when targeting systems. This largely due real empirical data can be captured, inferred, analyzed within boundaries operational realms. Undoubtedly, goal endeavors capture notions “true maliciousness” context significantly challenging, many factors, including, (1) complete maturity scarcity elaborative technical details related CPS, (2) diversity systems, (3) logistic privacy constraints are often strictly enforced owners operators. To this end, paper presents first step towards inferring tangible maliciousness accomplished innovating mechanisms, namely, investigating passive darknet Internet-scale traffic, instrumenting analyzing millions recent malware samples, deploying tailored, highly-interactive honeypots. Additionally, we analyze effect derived attack, Distributed Denial Service (DDoS) using discrete event simulation vessel passing canal. We postulate envisioned attack models associated impact could effectively exploited successfully provide marine transportation resiliency.