摘要: This article introduces a market for the services of agents into principal-agent model. The principal and potential are risk neutral. contract trades off adverse selection against moral hazard. In broad range circumstances optimal is linear in outcome. an incentive-compatible more able agent, larger his contractual share marginal output; thus, agent induced to work at rate closer first-best.
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