Optimal unemployment insurance: a guide to the literature

作者: Edi Karni

DOI:

关键词:

摘要: Unemployment insurance has been the subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies. These studies elucidate benefits cost unemployment insurance, namely, improved allocation risk bearing reduced incentives for work. In past two decades a branch literature emerged that deals with optimal design insurance. This influenced by ideas methods from field information economics theories labor economics. The result is collection models designed to highlight variety issues pertaining provision report reviews these issues, summarizes relevant literature, assesses its accomplishments, points out problems require further study.

参考文章(22)
Ronald G Ehrenberg, Ronald L Oaxaca, Unemployment Insurance, Duration of Unemployment, and Subsequent Wage Gain The American Economic Review. ,vol. 66, pp. 754- 766 ,(1976)
Peter Fredriksson, Bertil Holmlund, Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium Social Science Research Network. ,(1998) , 10.2139/SSRN.67509
Robert H. Topel, On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance The American Economic Review. ,vol. 73, pp. 541- 559 ,(2007)
Robert Topel, Finis Welch, Unemployment Insurance: Survey and Extensions Economica. ,vol. 47, pp. 351- 379 ,(1980) , 10.2307/2553156
David A. Green, W. Craig Riddell, The Economic Effects of Unemployment Insurance in Canada: An Empirical Analysis of UI Disentitlement Journal of Labor Economics. ,vol. 11, pp. 96- 147 ,(1993) , 10.1086/298330
Keith J. Crocker, Arthur Snow, The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information Journal of Public Economics. ,vol. 26, pp. 207- 219 ,(1985) , 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90005-2
Dale T. Mortensen, Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions ILR Review. ,vol. 30, pp. 505- 517 ,(1977) , 10.1177/001979397703000410
Carl Shapiro, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market: Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device The American Economic Review. ,vol. 74, pp. 45- 56 ,(1986) , 10.1017/CBO9780511559594.004
W. Henry Chiu, Edi Karni, Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 106, pp. 806- 827 ,(1998) , 10.1086/250030
M. C. Rorty, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Journal of the American Statistical Association. ,vol. 31, pp. 61- 66 ,(1936) , 10.1080/01621459.1936.10503313