Attacking AES Using Bernstein's Attack on Modern Processors

作者: Hassan Aly , Mohammed ElGayyar

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38553-7_7

关键词:

摘要: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was selected by NIST due to its heavy resistance against classical cryptanalysis like differential and linear cryptanalysis. Even after the appearance of modern side-channel attacks timing power consumption attacks, claimed that AES is not vulnerable attacks. In 2005, Bernstein [6] has successfully attacked OpenSSL implementation on a Pentium III processor completely retrieved full key using his cache attack. This paper reproduces Bernstein’s attack Dual-Core Core 2 Duo processors. We have implemented in latest release 1.0.1c most recent GCC compiler 4.7.0 running both Windows Linux some seconds sending 222 plaintexts at most. improved first round way measurements. Instead only above average information, we added minimum information which significantly results.

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