Frege's Puzzle

摘要: The nature of the information content declarative sentences is a central topic in philosophy language. natural view that sentence like "John loves Mary" contains which two individuals occur as constituents termed naive theory, and one has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument did not work Frege's puzzle, his rival account orthodox theory.In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends version presents proposal for its extension provides better picture than gives. He argues great deal what generally taken granted language over past few decades either mistaken or unsupported, consequently, much current research focused on wrong set questions.Salmon dissolves puzzle it usually formulated demonstrates how can be reconstructed strengthened to yield more powerful objection theory. then against new Frege presenting an idea yields both surprisingly rich original theory.Nathan Professor Philosophy, University California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.