Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point

摘要: Complex dynamic systems such as common-pool resource can undergo a critical shift at given threshold, the so-called tipping point, which potentially requires substantial changes from management system. We present in this research framed laboratory experiment design to examine how threat of economic sanctions influences strategic resource. use context East Atlantic bluefin tuna international fishery it has been archetype an overfished and mismanaged until dramatic reinforcement its regulations followed trade ban. consider endogenous threats their effects on cooperation through harvest decisions taken non-cooperative game theory could be sustained using trigger strategy. Our results show that fosters more cooperative behaviors, less over-exploitation, precautionary resources, reducing rent dissipation. This result is exacerbated when location point triggers sanction uncertain. In order avoid free-riding behaviors foster emergence self-enforcing agreement, we suggest introduce sanctions, restrictions, associated with uncertain biological limit reference points.