Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments
作者： Jeremy C. Stein
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摘要: This paper examines the problem faced by Federal Reserve in announcing its private information about future policies. Because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time-inconsistent policy, Fed cannot reveal policy objectives precisely credibly. It can, however, communicate some goals through "cheap talk" mechanism of Vincent Crawford Joel Sobel: making announcements that are imprecise, only giving ranges within which these may lie. Copyright 1989 American Economic Association.
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