摘要: This paper views family members as altruistic bargainers who negotiate with each other and in so doing are motivated by the assumption that a joint action dominates unilateral action. Bargaining refers to process whereby rational agents communicate make promises transmit threats--negotiate advance their interests. A great many demographic phenomena cannot be fully understood or accounted for without considering intrafamilial bargaining altruism. Children needed fulfill 2 distinct roles: directly furnish parents desired services eroding one anothers positions ensure such supplied at an affordable cost. To extent divorce necessitates wifes entry reentry into labor market highly marriage specific activities childbearing rearing costlier. As result expanded opportunities women alter intramarriage power relations favor; given prospect of bearing children tend erode womens therefore reduce fertility. young woman is more likely incur than older because her total accumulated human capital smaller. The relationship between modal rural urban migrating unit developing world--a single member rest his family--can modeled cooperative contractual arrangement. It familys strength positively influences magnitude migrant remittances. Overall properly explain hypothesize on predict some explicit accounting altruism appropriate.