On Efficient Distribution With Private Information

作者: Andrew Atkeson , Robert E. Lucas

DOI: 10.2307/2297858

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摘要: This paper is a study of the dynamics efficient distribution consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers, each whom subject to private, idiosyncratic taste shocks. We propose recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and Pareto optimal within this set. The applied several parametric examples. find allocation degree inequality continually increases, diminishing fraction population receiving increasing resources. discuss extent which these can be decentralized via market arrangements. private information. we has constant endowment flow single, non-storable good allocated period among large number consumers. Each period, consumers experience unpredictable, idiosyncratic, privately observed shocks affecting their marginal utility current consumption. Efficiency dictates more resources those who, any given have high consumption,

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