Environmental Economics and Modeling Marketable Permits: A Survey

作者: Luca Taschini , Luca Taschini

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摘要: This paper reviews fundamental concepts in environmental economics and explores theoretical results regarding the choice of key policy instruments for control externalities: taxes, subsidies marketable permits. The explains why today market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool allocating unpriced rights scarce resources. We survey how significant imperfections, pre-existing regulatory environment concentration both permit output markets can impede proper functioning system. main factors that affect effectiveness permits then discussed. Given importance understanding emission price formation, we overview recent attempts at developing valid models permits, taking into account banking borrowing opportunities, pollution abatement measures, strategic trading interactions presence asymmetric information market.

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