A framework for analyzing the state in economic history

作者: Douglass C North

DOI: 10.1016/0014-4983(79)90020-2

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摘要: IThe creation of a state is an essential precondition for economic growth. The state, however, the source man-made decline. This paradox should have made study central to history: Models be explicit part any analysis secular changes. They are not, and-though history poorer it-for good reason. Theorizing about has been favorite pastime scholars centuries, and long path historical research strewn with bones theories developed by historians political scientists; one may justly inquire whether another effort economist can fare better. There reasons cautiously optimistic answer. Modern extensions neoclassical theory proven powerful tools analysis; in recent years they applied variety issues, some degree success (Baumol, 1962; Buchanan Tullock, Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971; Breton, 1974). Neoclassical conceived as choice provided at very least disciplined logically consistent approach these issues-something that notably lacking much past literature on subject. offers promise developing refutable propositions nonmarket decision-making. Moreover, into organization revealed its close kinship organization. A satisfactory firm would step toward development (Coase, 1937; Alchian Demsetz, 1972). Yet we develop preliminary cautious limits such essay had gestation period over nine earlier versions presented meeting Public Choice Society Yale number university colloquia. I am particularly indebted Tom Borcherding, Elisabeth Case, Chris Hall, Roger Nell suggestions improved content clarity exposition.

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