Skeptical theism and divine permission: a reply to Anderson

摘要: Skeptical theism (ST) may undercut the key inference in evidential argument from evil, but it does so at a cost. If ST is true, then we lose our ability to assess all things considered (ATC) value of natural events and states affairs. And if that ability, whole slew undesirable consequences follow. So goes common consequential critique ST. In recent article, Anderson has argued this flawed. claims only consequence lack epistemic access potentially God-justifying reasons for permitting prima facie “bad” (or “evil”) event. But very different lacking ATC such events. God could have an (unknowable) reason not intervening prevent E yet still be (knowably) ATC-bad. Ingenious though is, article argues Anderson’s attempted defence This two reasons. First, most importantly, rely on questionable assumption he identifies. Indeed, can made quite easily by relying purely distinction between E. second, his position, correct, would serve undermine foundations