摘要: The mapping of the distribution voting weights into indices Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik, measuring a priori power, is not monotonic. Corresponding paradoxes imply potential to increase an agent’s power by decreasing his weight. Paradox proofness body achieved if strictly proportional vote distribution. In this paper, randomized decision rule proposed bring about paradox proofness.
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