Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent
作者： Ignatius Horstmann , Glenn M. MacDonald , Alan Slivinski
DOI: 10.1086/261338
关键词:
摘要: A model of patenting behavior is presented in which an innovating firm possesses private information about profits available to competitors, and patent coverage may not exclude …
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(6)
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