On the impossibility of instantiating PSS in the standard model

摘要: In this paper we consider the problem of securely instantiating Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) in standard model. PSS, proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [3] is a widely deployed randomized signature scheme, provably secure (unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks) Random Oracle Model. Our main result black-box impossibility showing that one can not prove unforgeability PSS against attacks using blackbox techniques even assuming existence ideal trapdoor permutations (a strong abstraction which inherits all security properties random permutation, introduced Kiltz Pietrzak Eurocrypt 2009) or recently lossy [20]. Moreover, show onewayness, most common property permutation does suffice to weakest criteria, namely zero attack. Our negative results easily be extended any scheme where recover string from valid signature.