The Revealed Objective Functions of Nonprofit Firms

作者: Richard Steinberg

DOI: 10.2307/2555478

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摘要: Although assertions have often been made about the objectives underlying behavior of nonprofit firms, there has no empirical confirmation these assertions. This article proposes a way to infer organization's objective function by estimating marginal donative product its fundraising. Panel data estimates derived using Hildreth and Houck's (1968) random coefficients model, suggest that welfare, education, arts firms are "service maximizers," health budget maximizers, research cannot be ascertained within family functions considered.

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