Externalities, Collective Goods and the Requirement of a State’s Intervention in Pollution Abatement

作者: François Lévêque

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9311-3_2

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摘要: The concepts of externality and collective good are often used by economists to infer that a state’s intervention is strictly necessary cope with the harmful effects pollution on environment. Such inference wrong. It also misleading. An example provided current debate voluntary approaches in abatement. These self-regulatory arrangements where firm or an industry association commits environmental programme vis-a-vis consumers local communities. A well-known Responsible Care Programme1 undertaken International Council Chemical Associations. Based common belief single means achieve abatement, such initiatives judged as reflecting pure communication strategy expected inavoidably result cosmetic aim paper remind nature hazardous emissions externalities their abatement goods do not logically imply ensuring reduction. exclusion private alternative public regulation theoretically founded. surveys market failures theory revisionism initiated Coase (1960) developed Law Economics literature.

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