Crowdsourcing with trembles: Incentive mechanisms for mobile phones with uncertain sensing time

摘要: Mobile phone sensing has become increasingly popular since it can collect and analyze real-time data anywhere anytime, especially with the help of mobile users via crowdsourcing. In order to stabilize crowdsourcing at a massive scale, incentive mechanisms are needed not only stimulate phones participate in sensing, but also incentivize organizer tasks maximum service time payoff. this paper, we study practical problem i.e., uncertainty, which may lead failures existing mechanisms. particular, model as perturbed Stackelberg game actually conduct during different periods rather than what they intend, like through trembling hand. We find that there exist Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibria (THP) given proper rewards. After characterizing THPs rigorous analysis, design achieve THP system wide total platform utility. finally verify correctness efficiency our proposed algorithms extensive experiments.