On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games.

摘要: Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of security games. As opposed to weak (WSE), SSE assumes that follower breaks ties in favor leader and this widely acknowledged justified by assertion defender can often induce attacker choose a preferred action making an infinitesimal adjustment her strategy. Unfortunately, games with resource assignment constraints, might not be valid; it possible cannot desired outcome. result, many results claimed literature may overly optimistic. To remedy, we first formally define utility guarantee strategy provide examples show higher than its guarantee. Second, inspired analysis leader's payoff Von Stengel Zamir (2004), called inducible (ISE), which owns highest always exists. Third, conditions when ISE coincides fact general case, extremely worse respect Moreover, introducing does invalidate existing algorithmic as problem computing polynomially reduces SSE. We also implementation for ISE, our experiments unveil empirical advantage over