An explanation of share tenancy in terms of unemployment, social norms and power

作者: Debarshi Das

DOI: 10.1080/09638190903217651

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摘要: Due to persistent unemployment, peasant families in developing countries tend employ more labour on the leased land plots than a capitalist would. In surplus societies, therefore, landlords may earn higher from leasing out self-cultivation. By endogenising disguised unemployment this paper shows that greater power and unity of conservative social norms explain persistence share tenancy economies.

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