Markets Versus Negotiations: The Emergence of Centralized Markets
作者： Zvika Neeman , Nir Vulkan
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.260740
关键词:
摘要: We study the incentives of privately informed traders who have access to two forms trade: direct negotiations with a small number buyers and sellers (or decentralized trade), centralized markets relatively large sellers. show that "weak" trader types (that is, high willingness pay low costs) will prefer trade through markets. This leads complete unraveling negotiations, so ultimately, all "serious" opt for trading market. Once this happens, no can profitably negotiations.
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