作者: Ben Maule , Eric Shieh , Craig Baldwin , Garrett Meyer , Joseph DiRenzo
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摘要: While three deployed applications of game theory for security have recently been reported at AAMAS [12], we as a community remain in the early stages these deployments; there is continuing need to understand core principles innovative theory. Towards that end, this paper presents PROTECT, game-theoretic system by United States Coast Guard (USCG) port Boston scheduling their patrols. USCG has termed deployment PROTECT success, and efforts are underway test it New York, with potential nationwide deployment.PROTECT premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg model offers five key innovations. First, departure from assumption perfect adversary rationality noted previous work, relying instead quantal response (QR) adversary's behavior --- best our knowledge, first real-world QR model. Second, improve PROTECT's efficiency, generate compact representation defender's strategy space, exploiting equivalence dominance. Third, show how practically real maritime patrolling problem game. Fourth, experimental results illustrate more robustly handles uncertainties than Finally, evaluating time provides data: (i) comparison human-generated vs schedules, (ii) Adversarial Perspective Team's (human mock attackers) analysis.