The open future, bivalence and assertion

作者: Corine Besson , Anandi Hattiangadi

DOI: 10.1007/S11098-012-0041-2

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摘要: It is highly now intuitive that the future open and past closed now—whereas it unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, settled was first. Recently, has become increasingly popular to claim openness of implies contingent statements about future, such as ‘There sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue non-bivalence contingents at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions future. These revealed by pragmatic judgments concerning correctness incorrectness assertions contingents. We data together plausible account assertion shows in many cases take (or false), though relevant respects. follows appeals intuition support untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

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