The Competition of International Corporate Governance Systems - A German Perspective

作者: Gabler Verlag , Peter Witt

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摘要: Abstract * Corporate governance theory deals with the optimal organization of management and control in companies many stakeholders. systems are shaped by national laws, capital market requirements, individual corporate decisions. For historical reasons, there large differences between international systems. But due to globalization product, labor, markets, a competition has evolved. In long run, this will lead convergence all systems, continuation different or dominance one system. An empirical study based on data from annual reports indicates that US Japanese system each have different, but distinctive strengths. The German is less well prepared for systems' might disappear run. Key Results complete globally. evidence reported paper suggests survive run as distinct equally efficient whereas (and probably converge system). Introduction mangement stakeholders, e.g. minority shareholders, institutional employees, debt providing banks etc. (Hart 1995, Shleifer/Vishny 1997, Tirole 2001). firm's structure trading laws its home country, requirements (in case stock exchange listing), own organizational decisions within framework existing laws. core tasks ensure efficiency find "fair" distribution resulting surplus among stakeholders (O'Sullivan 2000, Witt Whereas problem interests more same around world, actual place not (Charkham 1994, La Porta et al. 1998). Due developments, path dependencies, financing patterns firms very evolved (Roe 1996, Bebchuck/Roe 1999, Schmidt/Hackethal/Tyrell 2002). Scholars practitioners developed number frameworks models comparative analysis. One most prominent influential studies Europe 1994) directly compares five countries, traces their origins, shows they fit history political preferences. 1996) analyses an American perspective concludes structures do matter much performance. hypothesis yield advantages disadvantages, making it difficult be superior another. A recent (Schmidt/Spindler 2002) juxtaposes two stylized models, "outsider system" "insider system". authors both display typical disadvantages can regarded locally only important advantage greater degree flexibility adapting changes competitive environment. (2003, pp. 175-224) develops game theoretical first model, countries compete attract free choose location offering prices (tax packages) it. …

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