Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

作者: Ansgar Belke , Niklas Potrafke

DOI: 10.1016/J.JIMONFIN.2011.12.014

关键词:

摘要: This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries. We use quarterly data the 1980.1-2005.4 period and exclude EMU Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on interactions of a new time-variant index central bank independence with ideology. The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing when is low. In contrast, are higher under high. effect more pronounced exchange flexible. findings compatible view governments, an attempt to deflect blame their traditional constituencies, pushed market-oriented policies by delegating conservative bankers.

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