WORKER RESPONSES TO SHIRKING UNDER SHARED CAPITALISM

摘要: Group incentive systems have to overcome the free rider or 1/N problem, which gives workers an shirk, if they are succeed. This paper uses new questions on responses shirking from General Social Survey and a special NBER survey of at over 300 worksites in 14 companies that some form group pay examine how well can monitor their peers what do when not working up speed. The finds that: 1) most say detect fellow employees who shirk; 2) many report would speak shirker behavior supervisor, did so past; 3) proportion takes action against shirkers is greatest among paid under systems, smaller companies, with good employee-management relations; 4) incentives interact high-performance human resource policies such as employee involvement teams, training, task variety, low levels supervision, fixed wages induce more act shirking; 5) workplaces where there anti-shirking co-workers work harder, encourage other more, workplace facility effective ways should raise productivity profits.