Belief and Acceptance

作者: Paul Weirich

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_13

关键词:

摘要: Tradition takes knowledge to be true, justified belief. Accordingly, any theory of needs a supplementary It should say what belief is, and especially features determine whether the is true justified. Epistemology does not have its own account belief, but draws on interested branches philosophy. I present their views implications for epistemology. The first section provides general orientation. next three sections explore as viewed by philosophy language, logic, mind. following these considers epistemology gains introducing an attitude acceptance supplement or replace ordinary final conclusions

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