作者: Sergio Pastrana , Juan E. Tapiador , Guillermo Suarez-Tangil , Peris-Lopez , Pedro
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40667-1_4
关键词:
摘要: Code reuse attacks are advanced exploitation techniques that constitute a serious threat for modern systems. They profit from control flow hijacking vulnerability to maliciously execute one or more pieces of code the targeted application. ASLR and Control Flow Integrity two mechanisms commonly used deter automated based on reuse. Unfortunately, none these solutions suitable modified Harvard architectures such as AVR microcontrollers. In this work, we present attack against embedded devices shows how an adversary can arbitrary reused firmware other external libraries. We then propose software-based defense fine-grained random permutations memory. Our solution is installed in bootloader section device thus executes during every reset. also self-obfuscation technique hinder code-reuse bootloader.