Seeing through Network-Protocol Obfuscation

摘要: Censorship-circumvention systems are designed to help users bypass Internet censorship. As more sophisticated deep-packet-inspection (DPI) mechanisms have been deployed by censors detect circumvention tools, activists and researchers responded developing network protocol obfuscation tools. These proved be effective in practice against existing DPI now distributed with such as Tor. In this work, we provide the first in-depth investigation of detectability in-use obfuscators DPI. We build a framework for evaluation that uses real traffic captures evaluate detectability, based on metrics false-positive rate background (i.e., non obfuscated) traffic. exercise our show some previously proposed attacks from literature not censor might like. go develop new five tools they configured Tor, including: two variants obfsproxy, FTE, meek. conclude using all these could reliably detected determined sufficiently low rates use many censorship settings.