Agency theory and Japanese corporate governance

作者: Phillip H. Phan , Toru Yoshikawa

DOI: 10.1023/A:1015440702758

关键词:

摘要: Agency theory has been used to predict managerial strategic behavior in the past. However, critics have commented that this theory, its applications, too Anglo-American specific. Research non-Anglo-American settings scarce. Recent changes Japan Commercial Code and moves by Japanese corporations access global equity markets allow us test veracity of criticism examining how firms respond strategically increased requirement for disclosure transparency; whether they behave ways congruent with agency predictions. states managers who are held accountable their use corporate resources will deploy them enhance stockholder value rather than increase shares economic residual. Thus, we would expect observe a difference accompanying an exposure capital markets. Using data from firms, found some support usefulness when rules market discipline allowed operate.

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