Cabinet Coalition Formation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

作者: M. Winer

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_8

关键词:

摘要: The use of N-person game theory solution concepts to predict cabinet coalitions in European parliaments has been fairly limited. This is because most only the alternatives space and not which achieve these alternatives. In order make coalition predictions, additional ad-hoc assumptions are necessary. Competitive Solution attaches a structure each alternative space. It thus extremely applicable this problem.

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