摘要: This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and agent under constraint that agent's liability is limited. A necessary sufficient condition derived for existence first-best contract this constraint, bonus-based shown to be most efficient contractual form. Implications bonus are also discussed.
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